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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











IRENE FUH, Registered Nurse; KATHLEEN GUSTAFSON, Nurse Practitioner - 1st 
On-call Healthcare Provider; KATIE A. WHEELER, Registered Nurse; 
CONNECTIONS COMMUNITY SUPPORT PROGRAMS INC, Healthcare Provider; 
NURSE GREEN, Certified Nursing Assistant; 2ND ON-CALL PROVIDER, Healthcare 
Provider; TAMAR JACKSON, Medical Doctor; JANE DOE, Healthcare Provider 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the District of Delaware  
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:18-cv-00733) 
District Judge: Honorable Maryellen Noreika 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
April 21, 2020 
Before:  KRAUSE, MATEY and ROTH, Circuit Judges 
 







* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not 





Alex Ryle, an inmate proceeding pro se, appeals from the District Court’s order 
dismissing his complaint.  For the reasons that follow, we will affirm.  
Ryle filed claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and state law against four named 
defendants—three medical staff members at the prison and a private healthcare 
corporation—and four unidentified medical staff members.1   He alleged that, after 
sustaining a hand injury, he went to the infirmary and was treated by Irene Fuh on 
December 6, 2016.  Fuh, a nurse, gave Ryle medication to ease the pain and a hand splint, 
and instructed him to submit a “sick-call slip” so he could receive further treatment.  
After submitting the paperwork, Ryle returned to the infirmary four days later and was 
treated by Fuh and Katie Wheeler, another nurse in the infirmary.  Fuh told Ryle that she 
believed his hand was not broken, but, after speaking to an on-call provider, scheduled an 
X-ray for December 12, 2016.  For reasons unknown, that appointment was delayed until 
December 16, 2016.  After the X-ray, Ryle was taken to the emergency room where he 
was told by an orthopedic doctor that, because of the delay in treatment, nonsurgical 
resetting of the bone was no longer possible.    
On January 5, 2017, Ryle had surgery to fix his hand.  He claimed that, after 
anesthesia wore off, he was in extreme pain.  When he requested medication, a nurse 
offered to phone an on-call provider for authorization to give a him a painkiller.  
 




However, the provider declined to issue any other medication to Ryle.  Ryle was 
discharged from the infirmary after five days, allegedly in contravention of a prison 
policy stating that he was supposed to convalesce for months.  He alleged that Dr. 
Tamara Jackson failed to create an appropriate post-surgery pain management plan.   
Four medical officials and the prison’s healthcare corporation filed a motion to 
dismiss.  Ryle filed an amended complaint in response to defendants’ Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion, but later withdrew the amendment.  He attempted to file another amended 
complaint two months later, but it was struck for failure to comply with Rule 15.  The 
District Court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss, dismissed the federal claims 
against the remaining defendants sua sponte, and declined to exercise supplemental 
jurisdiction over the state law claims.  Ryle appealed. 
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   We construe Ryle’s pro se 
complaint liberally.  See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam).  We 
exercise plenary review over the order dismissing the complaint.  See Fleisher v. 
Standard Ins. Co., 679 F.3d 116, 120 (3d Cir. 2012); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 
223 (3d Cir. 2000).  “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  
 




 Ryle argues that the District Court erred by dismissing his Eighth Amendment 
claims based on the defendants’ involvement in his alleged misdiagnosis and pain 
management.  We do not agree.  To set forth a cognizable Eighth Amendment claim for 
inadequate medical care, a prisoner must allege (1) a serious medical need and (2) acts or 
omissions by prison officials that indicate deliberate indifference to that need.  Estelle v. 
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976).  A prison official is deliberately indifferent if he or she 
knows that a prisoner faces a substantial risk of serious harm and fails to take reasonable 
steps to avoid the harm.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).  However, prison 
authorities are “accorded considerable latitude in the diagnosis and treatment of 
prisoners,” Durmer v. O’Carroll, 991 F.2d 64, 67 (3d Cir. 1993), and “disagreement as to 
the proper medical treatment” does not give rise to a constitutional violation, Spruill v. 
Gillis, 372 F.3d 218, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). 
 With respect to each defendant, Ryle failed to allege deliberate indifference.  By 
Ryle’s own allegations, Fuh attempted to provide care to him on a number of occasions, 
providing, for example, medication and a splint, and scheduling an X-ray.  Even if this 
type of treatment was negligent (an issue we do not decide), medical negligence without 
accompanying deliberate indifference does not rise to the level of a constitutional 
violation.  See Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a physician has been 
negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 




Wheeler and Gustafson, who simply assisted Fuh in the treatment.  Ryle also cannot 
show deliberate indifference with regard to Nurse Green or Dr. Jackson because he 
expressed only “mere disagreement” with their post-surgery treatment plan.  See Spruill, 
372 F.3d at 235.  It appears Dr. Jackson merely authorized Ryle’s release from the 
infirmary after five days of recovery, allegedly in violation of prison policy.  Green 
attempted to ease Ryle’s pain by phoning an unnamed on-call provider to authorize 
stronger medication.  Under the circumstances, no deliberate indifference can be 
attributed to Green or Jackson. 
 Ryle also argues that the prison’s privately contracted healthcare provider 
maintained a policy that demonstrated deliberate indifference to his medical needs.  
Specifically, he claims that the policy requiring the submission of “sick-call slips” prior 
to receiving treatment exacerbated his hand injury.  However, because there has been no 
underlying constitutional violation by the individuals associated with the healthcare 
provider, the provider’s policy cannot be a basis for liability.  See Natale v. Camden Cty. 
Corr. Facility, 318 F.3d 575, 584 (3d Cir. 2003) (“In order for [a private healthcare 




[provider] policy or custom, and that the policy caused the constitutional violation they 
allege.” (emphasis added)).2   
  Ryle finally argues that he should have been given leave to amend his complaint 
before the District Court dismissed it.  Indeed, in § 1983 actions, a district court must 
give leave to amend before dismissing the complaint after a defendant moves to dismiss 
it, “unless amendment would be inequitable or futile.”  Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 
293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).  Here, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in 
concluding that giving Ryle leave to amend would have been futile.  Ryle filed an 
amended complaint in response to the motion to dismiss, which did not allege any new 
facts that would have shown that the defendants were deliberately indifferent.  Ryle 
withdrew that amendment, and attempted to file another amended complaint months 
later, which also failed to allege deliberate indifference.  After two unsuccessful attempts 
to amend, the District Court need not have given a third.3 
 
2 Because the District Court properly dismissed all federal claims against the defendants, 
it did not abuse its discretion in declining to exercise jurisdiction over the state law 
claims.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3); De Asencio v. Tyson Foods, Inc., 342 F.3d 301, 308 
(3d Cir. 2003).   
3 We find no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to strike Ryle’s amended 
complaint under Rule 15 as it was filed more than 21 days after the service of the 
defendants’ 12(b) motion and the court did not give leave to amend.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 
15(a).  In any event, as the District Court noted, even if it had allowed Ryle to amend his 
complaint for a third time, the analysis of the claims on the merits would not have 
changed because the proposed amended complaint and the original complaint were nearly 
identical.  The District Court also acted within its broad discretion when it declined to 
appoint counsel after consideration of the factors in Tabron v. Grace, 6 F.3d 147, 155-56 




 Accordingly, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.      
  
